Quicksilver כספית

The world of Rabbinic cures and punishments, according to Artscroll

Talmudic medicine does not guide Orthodox Jewish doctors today. Doctors glean neither remedies nor bioethics from the Talmudic cures in recent daf yomi (ch 14 Shabbat). So, how does Artscroll annotator R. Yosef Davis explain Talmudic folk medicine? In a note on “The efficacy of Talmudic remedies” (109b2:10), R. Davis begins: “Over the next few pages (109a-111a), a number of remedies for various physical disorders are recorded. Many of these cures, however, are not consistent with the known laws of nature.”  Here’s how R. Davis smooths over the Talmud’s conflict with science:

Beyond human reason. “… during the Creation, God invested various herbs, minerals and procedures with the power to effect remedies, some in ways that are comprehended by human reason and some in ways that are beyond our understanding” (Rashba I:413)

Known only to the wisest. Some remedies “are comprehensible only to those who are able to plumb the depths of the Sages’ words [Maharasha]. In particular , many of the various herbs recommended by the Gemara cannot be accurately identified.”

Do not try this at home. “Consequently, one should not attempt these remedies nowadays, since it is unlikely that anyone today will fathom the Talmud’s intentions, and one who finds his application of a remedy ineffective may come to belittle the words of the Sages” (Maharil, R. Akiba Eiger)

Ban on trying. “… one who does rely on Talmudic remedies in our era is punishable by excommunication” (Yam Shel Shlomo) More punishment below.

Changes in nature voids remedies. R. Davis says, “In addition, changes have occurred in the state of nature (nishtanu teva'im) since Talmudic times, and therapies which were efficacious in those times are not necessarily so nowadays.” [1]

Artscroll’s R. Davis is caught in the bind of the less-modern Orthodox. On the one hand, he admits that scientific knowledge rejects Talmudic medicine. He knows that even pious readers will find the remedies implausible. On the other hand, like much rabbinic discourse, he presupposes that one ought not deny outright the literal truth of a Talmudic statement. This may be due to etiquette, respect for elders, faith, epistemological humility, or the mythos of a legal hermeneutics. By stipulating the literal truth of Rabbinic utterances, the collision with science can lead Orthodoxy into controversial doctrines like da’as Torah, mystical pre-modern wisdom, and changes in nature (Hebrew data). Such Orthodox doctrines have been a Jewish blogging topic (see Hirhurim, Jewish Worker), esp. since the ban on R. Slifkin’s books about science and Torah.

Rabbinic clout. Why would a government official die of a snakebite if the (magical) remedy was apparently available? Abaye says that “perhaps he was bit by a Rabbinic (d’rabbanan) snake, for which there is no cure.” (bShab 110a) Artscroll’s R. Yosef Davis uses Abaye’s obscure explanation as a teaching moment. “Abaye surmised that the officer had violated some Rabbinic law…. Although some Biblical transgressions carry the death penalty and some do not, all Rabbinic offenses are punishable by death [at the hand of God] (Eruvin 21b and Rashi).  Etc.” [2] In Jewish lore, God’s death penalty is often executed by animals, here via snake bite.
 
In sum, Talmudic remedies do not conform with modern science. To have faith in the infallibility of Talmudic texts, you can rely on several controversial doctrines. However, Jewish law requires that we use modern doctors. We are forbidden to use Talmudic folk cures. If the cures don’t kill you, a snake bite might do the trick.

Shavua tov,

Kaspit  כספית

[1] Tosafot (Moed Qatan 11a), Hagahot R. Emden (Shab 129b), Magen Avraham (OH 173) and Kesef Mishneh (Hil. Deot 4:18) 

[2] All rules in Halakhah may be fundamentally divided into the categories of Biblical i.e. revealed rules (d’oraita) and supporting Rabbinic rules (d’rabbanan). Transgressions of revealed law are punished by fines, flogging, offerings, exile, etc. and the death penalty. Rabbinic rule transgressions carry various earthly penalties, too, but here we learn that all d’rabbanan violations incur divinely-administered capital punishment.

Bloggers defend R. Feinstein’s approach to cigarette smoking

Cigarette smoking is a form of self-induced toxic poisoning. So why did the greatest American authority on Jewish law (poseq), R. Moshe Feinstein, not declare tobacco smoking as prohibited? As Hirhurim points out, R. Feinstein did forbid marijuana. I’ve reviewed some of the comments on Hirhurim who criticize R. Feinstein on tobacco. Now let’s look at blog commenters and others who defend R. Feinstein’s approach. As noted previously, Reb Moshe said (1963, 1981) that smoking is not prohibited as self-endangerment because, given that so many indulge (dashu bo rabim), "The Lord preserves the simple" (shomer peta'im ha-Shem). Defenders mostly re-apply R. Feinstein’s approach so as to prohibit smoking:

A. The informed judge. Some argue that, if only R. Feinstein had known the extent of the health risks, he would have prohibited smoking. This is plausible and has long been advocated by his son-in-law, R. Moshe Tendler. (See D. below and [2]). However, I would point out that R. Feinstein had good access to health evidence in 1981 and still upheld that smoking is permitted under Jewish law. Indeed, R. Feinstein deliberately dismisses the health evidence as (potentially) erroneous.

B. The informed smoker. As long as smokers become aware of the serious health risks of smoking, they no longer qualify for the exemption that “The Lord preserves the simple”. Rabbi J. David Bleich recently argued that R. Feinstein’s 1963 ruling “accurately reflects the societal reality of that time… However, it is more than likely that, at present that condition no longer obtains.” [1] Thus, with mandatory package warnings (U.S.) and anti-smoking campaigns, most people do not take smoking risks for granted. (i.e., the dashu beh rabim exemption is gone)

C. Cumulative harm. A few commenters pointed out that it’s difficult to argue that any given cigarette causes harm. True, one cigarette may lead to many more. But a single cigarette cannot be forbidden as self-endangerment (e.g. Gil). Conversely, Mar Gavriel said: “I'm not sure that that's correct. For one thing, nicotine is inherently a poison. And for another, the act of inhaling smoke poses imminent danger to one's health. It won't be permanent, irreversible damage, but it will cause damage.” I would note that neither side clarifies the level of habitual smoking that might be prohibited under Jewish law.

D. Long-term harm. An anonymous blogger noted that Jewish law cannot easily forbid an uncertain harm that may be caused over the long haul. I would add that R. Bleich distinguishes between immediate and long-term risks (based on Binyon Zion 137). Since smoking involves long-term risks, R. Bleich argues that smoking is permitted as long as less than 50% of smokers are not irreversibly harmed. In 1977 and 1983, R. Bleich used this threshold to justify R. Feinstein’s conclusion. However, recently R. Bleich noted “that the cumulative risks … foreshorten the lives of the majority of smokers.” [1]

E. A defect in rabbinic authority. Mar Gavriel raises the question of whether Rabbis nowadays have authority under Jewish law to forbid smoking through a precautionary measure (gezerah). Indeed, R. Bleich (1977, 2003) asserts that modern Rabbis cannot proclaim a new health-based issur. Nevertheless, now even R. Bleich concedes that smoking is forbidden by the approach taken by R. Feinstein.

F. Halakhah responds to the community. Aramis argues: “What R. Moshe wanted to do was … not issue a pesak to the community which would be observed mainly in the breach.” Aramis is correct that halakhic principles that discourage rulings that the observant Jewish community cannot abide. Thus, Reb Moshe may permit smoking as long as people cannot abide by a prohibition. [3] This hypothesis cannot be proven but R. Feinstein’s 1981 obiter dicta lend credence to this notion.

Well, I've tried to do justice to the blog debate on Hirhurim, which I'd missed. Hopefully, I can wrap up my analysis later (by editing or with another post). Meanwhile,

Good shabbos,

Kaspit  כספית

[1] Tradition 2003 (37:3) p.96-7,

[2] RCA Roundtable. (Statement by progressive Orthodox Rabbis Saul Berman, Reuven Bulka, Daniel Landes and Jeffrey Woolf.) “Proposal on smoking” (unpublished) July 1991.

[3] Alternatively, R. Feinstein’s position may be explained by halakhic principles that authorize Rabbis not to publicize certain rules. If so, he may privately consider smoking forbidden but feel that it is inappropriate to say so. This principle can be invoked to protect the overall integrity of halakhah.

Comparing Gaza and the Holocaust may violate Jewish law

[UPDATED] In a Cross-currents post this week, the following question is posed:

“[The children of Gaza settlers were] wearing the yellow star with the word jude in Germanic characters emblazoned upon it. Do such tactics trivialize the real Holocaust? Some say so. After all, as tragic as these evictions are, these Jews are being expelled not by Nazis who wish to destroy them, but by fellow Jews who, for the most part, have tried to display gentleness and sympathy.”

The Cross-currents post then endorses and fuels the comparison of Gaza to the Holocaust. The post states: “in the air there lingers a faint Holocaust aroma: forced evacuations; barriers of barbed wire; people forbidden to enter the area; … To be sure, not a Holocaust, but certainly redolent of it.” The post refers to the removal of Gaza settlers as a “velvet-gloved mini-Holocaust.”

UPDATE: The author has responded to critics such as yours truly. He states:

In no lexicon are terms like “faint aroma” or “redolent” anything more than suggestions of a distant recollection. Under no circumstances are they to be construed—nor were they intended—as indicating equivalence—especially when I wrote, “to be sure, not a Holocaust…” It is obvious that the horrors of the Holocaust are sui generis, and are not to be placed on the same level with any other such event in history. I certainly did not intend to compare Gaza and the Holocaust, nor do I think I articulated such sentiments (though I did use the term “mini-Holocaust”) but if I gave that impression, I apologize and will try to be more clear in the future.

MY REVISED VIEW: This response deserves to be read in full, especially where he distinguishes between detached analysis and an emotional appreciation for the evicted settlers. In a spirit of "detachment as a counterbalance to our passion," the post below is being edited to focus on a halakhic rebuke of those who compare the Gaza disengagement to the Holocaust, or Israeli forces to Nazis.

The yellow star tactic and other Nazi comparisons do trivialize the Nazi era and the Holocaust. The Holocaust and the array of Nazi persecutions should be characterized in the context of ethnic persecution and genocide. Mass murders in Rwanda, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Armenia, and various aboriginal peoples might be compared to the Holocaust. Many governmental actions are oppressive and immoral, but few can responsibly be labeled a “mini-Holocaust”.

What about the forced evictions? Both Western law and Jewish law give government some discretion with evictions. Even under the “rule of law” [2], of course, evictions may violate human rights -- hence the outcry over the U.S. Supreme Court’s Kelo eminent domain case. While more traumatic than Kelo, the Gaza evacuation likewise offers compensation. Plus, resettlement within the Jewish state. While the Cross-roads post refers only to “a faint Holocaust aroma,” the yellow stars and other rhetoric send an objectionable message.

Those who compare the Gaza evacuation to the Holocaust a "mini-Holocaust", this Cross-currents post insult the IDF and Israeli police. They defame the Israeli government and leaders. It approves the slandering of Israeli Jews as (faintly) comparable to Nazis.

Toxic speech, vitriol, constitutes a severe violation of Jewish law. Slander, defamation, and insult are prohibited through various provisions of halakhah. For instance, wronging by words (honayat devarim) “is worse than a wrong inflicted in financial dealings, because restitution can be made for one and not the other; one is financial, while the other is personal.” (Mishneh Torah, trans Birnbaum) Therefore, comparing the Gaza evacuation to the Holocaust may be a violation of Jewish law on toxic speech.

Should we excuse the Gaza settlers themselves for claiming that they are like victims of the Nazis? Maybe. They feel victimized, desperate. Yet, if we excuse their Holocaust and Nazi rhetoric, wouldn’t we also need to excuse Palestinians comparisons of Zionism to racism and IDF actions to Nazism?

Still, the post at Cross-currents So, comparisons with the Nazi era is are inexcusable. Our rabbinic leaders ought to oppose any comparison of the IDF, Israeli police, or Israel and its leaders to the Nazis. American Rabbis ought not compare the Gaza evacuation to a mini-Holocaust. The post at Cross-currents should be retracted.

The post’s Defamatory language is permissible under secular law in the U.S.and Israel, thanks to freedom of speech. However, the post the yellow star and evocations of the Nazi era violate Jewish law and ethics, which the settlers author surely recognizes as morally and divinely binding.

Kaspit  כספית

PS  Jewish law offers guidance on proper rebuke of fellow Jews. I would argue that the Nazi comparison also violates the Jewish standards for rebuke of Israel. I hope that my comments here are a proper rebuke. While rebuke is often best done in private, please note that the Cross-currents post itself invites public comment.

PSS What about Missippi Governor Haley Barbour's comparison of hurricane Katrina to Hiroshima? Well, the comparison is somewhat off-kilter, I would say, but it was said in the heat of the moment, not strategically, and I suspect it doesn't offend.

Sports are healthy even for observant Jews

Hazardous contact sports, like Quidditch, may be off limits for observant Jews. Even skiing may be forbidden (per DB and (?) Rabbi Willig). Nevertheless, sports and exercise are supported by Jewish law (halakhah). So this is out of bounds:

"The town of Kiryat Sefer has between 20 and 30 thousand residents (at last count). They are now constructing their first swimming pool (see Kiddushin 29a). They have yet to construct a single basketball court." Recent post at On the Contrary!

Sample halakhic arguments in favor of sports as exercise:

"Rav Moshe [Feinstein] writes that providing a swimming pool for students in the summer constitutes an act of kindness, since they need a place to cool off in the heat and sometimes this can also bring them to exert themselves more in their Torah study." (Rabbi Dr. Asher Meir citing Igrot Moshe Even Ha-ezer IV:61)

"I would think that baseball, being a means of physical exercise that isn't too boring to expect a kid to pursue regularly, is a chiyuv di'Oraisa midin [duty directly from the Biblical law] 'vinishmartem mi'od linafshoseichem' [safeguard yourselves greatly]. Anyone who has a stationary bike collecting dust in the basement knows that the hardest part of exercise is making it interesting enough to make you keep at it. Baseball qualifies." R. Micha Berger, Jan 2000 Avodah list. [Trans mine.]

See also, Gedolim and ballplaying stories from Avodah.

Play ball,

Kaspit      כספית

Bloggers criticize R. Feinstein on cigarette smoking

Cigarette smoking is a test case for a Jewish legal (halakhic) critique of toxicality. Tobacco exemplifies the business with a profitable technology that happens to cause unintended harm as a side effect. [1] As a business practice that poisons people, the tobacco industry is an exaggerated paradigm for many lesser environmental and occupational toxic risks. Cigarette smoking and other health risks were discussed in comments to a post on marijuana and addiction [2] by Rabbi Gil Student at Hirhurim. The comments discussed whether an individual Jew should be prohibited under Jewish law from smoking cigarettes. The Hirhurim discussion focused on the rulings (psaq) of the late R. Moses Feinstein, who declined to prohibit smoking in responsa in 1963 and again in 1981[3].

At the outset, I'd say that the comments miss a crucial aspect of the halakhic status of smoking in Orthodox Judaism. Rabbi Feinstein and other halakhic authors forbid, in effect, smoking from synagogues and study halls (batei midrash). By implication, then, there is a halakhic consensus that smoking is prohibited in all indoor spaces shared with non-smokers. [4] This consensus adds greatly to a hermercurial critique of environmental and occupational hazards.

Smoking can be prohibited as self-endangerment (ushmartem meod et nafshoteichem). So argues a few authors before R. Feinstein's first psaq, as well as R. Eliezer Waldenberg afterwards [5]. However, Rabbi Feinstein argues that smoking is exempt because many people engage in it (dashu beih rabim) and, hence, smoking is one of those accepted practices for which “the Lord preserves the simple” (shomer peta'im Hashem).

R. Feinstein also argues in 1963 that many other great rabbis (gedolei Torah) have smoked. Mycroft argued that “he wouldn't say something is assur that Rabbanim have been doing for centuries.” However, it’s not clear why R. Feinstein relies on this argument. Does he view these past practices as a legal precedent (ma-aseh rav)? Does he believe that earlier rabbis had an inspired capacity that outweighs medical evidence (da’as Torah)? Does he want to avoid harming the reputations of past and current colleagues? In his 1981 ruling, R. Feinstein speaks strenuously against smoking as an inappropriate and excessive desire (ta’avah). [Noted by Literati.] Also, as I belatedly commented, addiction to smoking is arguably forbidden by R. Feinstein explicitly. (Contra the original post R. Student. See [6], below.)

Many commenters criticize R. Feinstein for not prohibiting tobacco smoking under Jewish law. These criticisms include:

(a) Personal bias. Some claim that Rabbis are biased due to their personal smoking. This claim itself is said to be disrespectful or, alternatively, such bias irrelevant, because all psaq (Jewish law rulings) has a subjective aspect. I would add: even were it historically and psychologically “true”, this claim of bias by a halakhic authority does not invalidate the ruling. [Under Jewish law, there are more extreme conflicts of interest that may invalidate a judge.]

(b) Protecting colleagues. Some comments imply that, in permitting cigarettes, R. Feinstein acted in order to improperly protect his smoking colleagues. I see this as highly implausible. First, because R. Feinstein made other decisions that offended his colleagues. Second, because he may be acting properly under Jewish law to protect the reputation and public standing of colleagues, i.e. communal leaders and halakhic authorities. Were consideration of colleagues improper, he would not have mentioned this reason explicitly. (Judges in every legal system need to protect the integrity of other judges. Each legal system can be evaluated in terms of how judges protect each other, and whether they are worthy of such protection.)

(c) Smokers as fools. Since R. Feinstein permits smoking because “God preserves fools”, one might infer that only fools are permitted to smoke.[7] However, I think that the reference to “fools” (peta’im) should not be taken too literally. (Talmudic law can borrow phrases like this from the Hebrew Bible and change/ignore the original meaning.) Would R. Feinstein imply that smokers are fools, when he himself refers to gedolim as smokers. He also speaks respectfully and sympathetically of average, hard-working smokers.

(d) A ban could have saved many lives. An anonymous commenter assumes that many smokers “took [R. Feinstein's] words as gospel from above”. However, I would point out that any smokers (and community leaders) who sincerely wanted to take R. Feinstein’s words as gospel would have known to stop smoking based even his first psaq. The 1981 letter appeals to his followers and strongly opposes smoking, even if it does not consider it technically forbidden.

In my next post, I will discuss how other comments at Hirhurim sought to explain or defend R. Feinstein’s position on the smoking of cigarettes.

Kaspit כספית

PS Dedicated to my mother, an early adopter of anti-smoking policies, and to my father, for following her psaq.

[1] Perhaps I’m too sanguine with “unintended” because, by approx the 1950s, tobacco companies intentionally took advantage of the addictive aspects of cigarettes. Still, even in knowingly selling a nicotine delivery device, the companies do not intend to kill off their customer base.

[2] Hirhurim cited R. Feinstein's psaq on marijuana, translated here.

[3] The 1963 letter (Igrot Moshe YD 249): “One should certainly take care not to start smoking, and to take proper care in desisting. But should one conclude that it is forbidden as an activity dangerous to one’s health? The answer is that because the multitude are accustomed to smoking, and the Gemara in such a case invokes the principle that “the Lord preserveth the simple,” tractates Shabbat 129b and Niddah 31a, and in particular since some of the greatest Torah scholars in the present and previous generations do or did smoke [there is no prohibition]. Consequently even someone who does take the stringent view, and does not smoke out of concern for the health danger, may properly offer a smoker a match, and not be concerned about the prohibition against facilitating a transgression.” Translated by Menachem Slae. Smoking and damage to health in the halakhah. Jerusalem, Acharai Publ., 1990

I have not seen the 1981 letter translated. (Igrot Moshe HM 2:76)

[4] However, R. Feinstein ruled against indoor pollution from tobacco as a nuisance, not as a toxic pollutant. (Igrot Moshe HM 2:18, letter dated 1980)

[5] R. Waldenberg translated in B’Or ha’Torah 8 (1993) and, with R. Halevi, by R. Helfgot here.

[6] "... it is certainly better not to smoke, particularly for a Ben Torah, since this is a habit which maybe dangerous and which affords no benefit or pleasure to anyone who is not addicted [hur'glu]. Certainly one should not take up smoking or allow his children to do so, even if he himself is already addicted [nitragel]. Besides the danger involved, there is good reason to prohibit smoking* [assur le-hitragel] because one should not habitualize himself to all sorts of pleasures [ta'avot] ...." Translated by Slae, op cit, p.41, transliterations mine. *Better: "prohibit getting addicted"

[7] Ari: "I heard from a talmid of R David Feinstein that 'shome pisuim Hashem' isn't a Heter. It means if you do this then shomer pisuim Hashem ie you're an idiot but go ahead because G-d guards fools."

Red Sox zimmun (or beit din?)

On August 12th, Red Sox players Gabe Kapler (below), Kevin Youkilis (right) and Adam Stern (left) played in the ninth inning against Texas. Perhaps the first time that three Jews took the field at the same time in major league baseball. Reports by The Forward and The Boston Globe did not clarify whether the players then formed a zimmun (quorum) and benched "Grace After Meals" at a celebratory dinner.

B'hatz'lakhah garba'im (Go Sox!),

Kaspit

PS Rumor has it that we'll see a Fleer (Jewish Major Leaguers) baseball card for these three magi by Chanuka!

Adam Stern (2-12-80) is adored by his hometown London, Ontario, where he went to St. Thomas Aquinas (!) High School. (Photo SoxProspects.) This Gabe Kapler fan site has many more photos. Youkilis hit by pitch 6-18-05 (AP photo).

Kilayim as mixed metaphor for genetic engineering?

mThough the Biblical mixed species law of kilayim is treated as a mathematical puzzle in recent daf yomi (Shab 84b-85), kilayim is also invoked in Jewish bioethics on genetic engineering. The kilayim law prohibits the planting and breeding of mixed species together. Kilayim has been used to argue against genetic engineering and, in particular, against genetically modified foods. The arguments against genetic engineering cite the Biblical verses (Lev. 19:19 cp. Dt. 22:9-11) on kilayim and later rabbinic texts (e.g., Ibn Ezra). For instance:

How does this verse [Lev. 19:19] relate to transgenic foods -- foods produced by combining DNA between species that are naturally prevented from cross-breeding? If we interpret it in the manner of Ramban, it seems to bar such trans-species alterations. According to Ramban, each species represents a special force and tampering with their boundaries can cause unfathomable harm. Because he was only considering crosses through naturally permitted pathways (as in creating a mule), it's likely he would have regarded genetic transfers between species that are naturally prevented from crossbreeding as a far more severe violation of the divine order, since it breaks down more fundamental boundaries. Accordingly, in an approach such as his, both the manufacture and consumption of transgenic foods would be prohibited.

Jewish opposition to genetically modified foods also draws upon the le-mino principle of Rabbi. Samson Raphael Hirsch. R. Hirsch writes:

Regarding the Species as Divine Order…. You should not interfere with the natural order which you find fixed by God in His world for its ultimate good. You must, by respecting the boundaries of that order, guard yourself against allowing the free use and transformation of this world, which He has granted to you, to degenerate into a God-forgotten, world-destructive presumption. (Horeb #402)

Hirsch asserts that the kilayim rules mandate a policy of non-interference with the actual reproduction of species. These rules avoid disruption of the natural order and of the purity required for the existence of the species. They apply to all species. However, Hirsch believes that species are fixed, eternal and unchanging, scientific presuppositions which are not endorsed by all.

To date, Orthodox posqim have not found the mixed species (kilayim) ban as a persuasive analogue against genetic engineering. Among the reasons not to apply the kilayim as a halakhic analogy for genetic engineering, it is argued: (1) The Biblical concern with mixed species does not pertain directly to GMOs. Still, Rabbinic authorities disagree about the kilayim of plants in shedding light on genetic engineering methods that transfer genetic material across species. (2) Kilayim cannot be extended analogically because it is a khoq, an “irrational” law. (3) Furthermore, there is some concern that genetic materials falls under the exclusion of materials that are not visible or are too minute. (But see R. S.Z. Auerbach cited by Wolff). (4) Finally, starting with the Talmud, rabbis disagree about whether kilayim rules ought to apply to non-Jews.

For Jews who differentiate the ethics of genetic engineering from a strictly halakhic (Jewish law) decision, you might appreciate this warning Rabbi Hirsch: “Do not forget that God has summoned you to the task of serving the world and cultivating it protectingly, but not to enter destructively into this orderly course of development through your self-seeking. Do not forget this, and do not put the powers of a created being which have been designated for its own species to the use of sustaining another species.” (Horeb 408)

Kaspit  כספית

Links to texts about kilayim and genetic engineering:

Goldschmidt, E., and Maoz, A. (1999) "Genetic engineering in plants--scientific background and Halacha aspects." Assia 17: 50-65 (in Hebrew).

Druker, Steven. Are genetically engineered foods in accord with Jewish law?

A Jewish Perspective on Genetic Engineering by Rabbi Akiva Wolff.

Articles in Social Action and by Weizmann Prof. Esra Galun, and COEJL discussion paper.

A Levinasian unreading on industrial waste

I didn’t expect to find Levinas writing about industrial waste. Levinas writes that “the nakedness of the face that turns to me and the disclosure of the thing illuminated by its form” are radically different. The difference arises partly because things cannot be reduced merely to their form, their function. In reality, I gather, things saturate their conceptual form, spill over. So, to portray the transcendent reality of the face, Levinas reaches for a metaphor by alluding to industry’s inevitable waste and entropy:

The things are naked, by metaphor, only when they are without adornments: bare walls, naked landscapes. They have no need of adornment when they are absorbed in the accomplishment of the function for which they are made: when they are subordinated to their own finality so radically that they disappear in it. They disappear beneath their form. The perception of individual things is the fact that they are not entirely absorbed in their forms; they then stand out in themselves, breaking through, rending their forms, are not resolved into the relations that link them up to the totality. They are always in some respect like those industrial cities where everything is adapted to a goal of production, but which, full of smoke, full of wastes and sadness, exist also for themselves. For a thing nudity is the surplus of its being over its finality. It is its absurdity, its uselessness, which appears only relative to the form against which it contrasts and of which it is deficient. The thing is always an opacity, a resistance, an ugliness.

My opening paragraph (above) is at best an “unreading” because I cannot claim to be qualified to proffer a reading of Levinas. But I’m not surprised to find him critical of the technological ideal. Or am I over-interpreting this text?

Kaspit

Source: Totality and Infinity, p.74, emphasis added

See the (renamed?) On the Contrary here and here. See also Schmiedgen p159.

The Jewish labor movement. Rick Sloan condemns anti-semitism over AFL-CIO split

Between the AFL-CIO split and the Gaza disengagement, it’s a bit wrenching to be a Jewish labor type. With at least one prominent Jew (SEIU President Andy Stern) involved in the AFL-CIO split-up, it’s not surprising to learn about an ugly undercurrent of anti-semitism. Thankfully, though not surprisingly, his labor union opponents -- like Rick Sloan (IAM) -- strongly condemn anti-semitism and other hate speech. Rick wrote:

There are lots of valid reasons to oppose what Andy Stern and his allies want to do within the AFL-CIO. But the most grotesque reason cited on this blog is the fact that Andy Stern is Jewish. Anti-Semitism has absolutely no place in the American Labor Movement. None. Ours is a movement built over more than a century, a movement built by the brains and brawn and deeply held beliefs of millions of Jewish workers. Hopefully, their contributions to what we have today will be respected and valued.

      And while we are at it, we should respect and value the pantheon of exceptional Jewish labor leaders -- Sidney Hillman, Al Shanker, Andrew Stern and so many others - who fought (and still fight) for a better life for their members. Hopefully, in this new century, new names will be added to that pantheon.

       As the IAM's Communications Director, I will use every tool in our toolbox to oppose what Andy Stern, Jim Hoffa, Bruce Raynor and John Wilhelm are trying to do at the AFL-CIO. To me and to thousands of Machinists Union members, the stakes for the American Labor Movement are high and growing higher. But nothing, absolutely nothing, justifies such a vile attack and it must be condemned it in the strongest possible terms. As trade unionists, let us put aside our differences and stand shoulder to shoulder with Andy Stern on this. After all, an injury to one is an injury to all. (5/12/05)

This is exactly what must be spoken: solidarity even in disengagement. Yasher koach!

Since I'm reading about work in tractate Shabbat, I want to blog about Jews and the labor movement. Plus, thanks to my friend Jordan Barab at Confined Space for the strong plug.

Re: shabbat, Orthodox and Reform Rabbis used the Sabbath in the labor struggle w/ILGWU et alia for a 40 hr/5 day work week. Reform Judaism is still very active on labor issues. (The Orthodox much less so, letza’areynu.)

Still, I suspect "secular" ("cultural"?) Jews are those most involved in groups like The Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action (Boston), Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Boston , Jewish Council on Urban Affairs (Chicago), Jews for Racial and Economic Justice (NYC), Jews United for Justice (DC area), Progressive Jewish Alliance (L.A.), the Workmen's Circle/Arbeter Ring (founded in 1900), and the Jewish Labor Committee (see photo, also bibliographies of the Jewish labor movement and labor and rabbinic texts).

Kaspit  כספית

PS See one of my favorite labor leaders in the Jewish Hall of Fame (!)

“Don’t kill yourself blogging” -- Hilchot Blogging

We read the other day that Resh Lakish finds a verse to justify self-sacrifice for the Torah:

The words of Torah come to fruition only with one who kills himself for it. As it is said, “This is the Torah of a person who would die in a tent.” (Shab 83b sof  on Num. 19.14)

Maimonides declares (Hilchot Talmud Torah 3:12):

Words of Torah are sustained… only with one who kills himself for them, and always endures pain, and gives no sleep to his eyes, nor rest to his eyelids.

Of course, martyrdom and self-sacrifice for Torah go without saying. Why does Reish Lakish state the obvious? (פשיטא) We can infer that he and Maimonides come to exclude killing oneself over another activity, namely blogging. 

Implications (halakhah le-ma’aseh):

• Like Yogi daBear, busy bloggers need picnics. (Withdrawal pains notwithstanding.)
• Jeff at Sustainablog acted properly in not pushing his Blogging Round the Clock fundraiser ad absurdum. (50 posts is enough for one day)
• You know you’re in trouble when… you fit AbbaGav’s list.

Pace yourself,

Kaspit  כספית

P.S. Is there an exception for professional bloggers? Sure, Jewish law allows workers to assume reasonable risks to make a living (e.g., contact sports). More people die working than you may realize. However, if you are reading this obscure blog, you surely aren’t one of the chosen few who earn a living by blogging.